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Abstract 
Although the disclosure of corporate risks is considered as key information for sound investors’ decision making, 
recent research has shown that companies’ reporting practices are unhelpful, as they are generic and boilerplate. 
The current empirical evidence is based mainly on the information provided in the annual reports of listed 
companies, whereas research on risk disclosures in initial public offerings (IPOs) is still limited. This paper 
performs a quantitative and qualitative analysis of risk reporting within IPO prospectuses for a sample of six 
manufacturing and six information technology (IT) Italian companies. The aim is to provide further empirical 
evidence meaningful to regulators and accounting standard setters to: i) define ‘best practice’ for risk reporting 
and ii) to assess the extent to which industry affects risk disclosures. The level of risk information is measured by 
carrying out a detailed content analysis, based on a coding instrument comprising 76 risk categories and two type 
attributes (time and quantitative orientation), with each aspect of the risk information expressed in terms of lines. 
The findings indicate that prospectuses place significant emphasis on external risks, but neglect other sources of 
uncertainties. The comparison between the two industries shows that they share similar disclosure practices, with 
the IT companies disclosing significantly higher proportions of forward-looking and external risk information 
than the manufacturers.  
Keywords:  Disclosure, risk reporting, IPO prospectuses, content analysis  
 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, companies’ risk disclosures have gained worldwide attention among regulators and investors. 
Several accounting standards and regulations (e.g., IFRS 7, FFR No. 48, GAS 5) and professional guidelines 
(ACCA, 2014; CICA, 2006; ICAEW, 1997, 1999, 2002) have been issued to enhance risk reporting. At their 
simplest, forward-looking disclosures of financial and non-financial risks are regarded as key information 
necessary to understand how a firm is managed, to determine its value drivers, and, finally, to support investors’ 
sound decision making (Cabedo & Tirado, 2004; Courtis, 1999; Schrand & Elliott, 1998; Solomon, Solomon & 
Norton, 2000; Wallman, 1996). Given the increasing attention in the field, most research has sought to examine 
the quality and usefulness risk disclosures (ICAEW, 2011). Recent studies have shown that current reporting 
practices are rather vague, offering only historically oriented information and limited quantifications of risk 
exposure (Abraham & Shrives, 2014; Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Kajüter, 2006; Lajiliand & Zéghal, 2005; 
Linsley & Shrives, 2006). On the other hand, there is also some indirect evidence of the information content and 
usefulness of risk disclosures (Campbell, Chen, Dhaliwal, Lu, & Steele, 2014; Linsmeier, Thornton, 
Venkatachalam & Welker, 2002; Rajgopal, 1999; Schrand, 1997).   
Despite the widespread interest in risk disclosure, few studies have examined risk disclosures in Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) prospectuses (Deumes, 2008; Hill & Short, 2009). The current empirical evidence is based 
mainly on the information provided in the annual reports of listed companies. At the same time, there is a general 
view that IPO prospectuses are important vehicles of risk information. ICAEW (1999) shows that prospectuses 
provide extensive risk disclosures that can be used as a benchmark for defining disclosure best practices. 
Deumes (2008) supports this view, demonstrating that Dutch IPO risk warnings can successfully predict the 
volatility of companies’ future stock prices. Yet, only in the UK, Hill and Short (2009) have investigated the 
content and the characteristics of IPO risk warnings. The present study extends this evidence, by examining risk 
disclosures of Italian IPO companies. The main aim is to inform the current debate surrounding the content and 
the quality of risk reporting. In general, Italian companies entering the stock market should be keen on 
addressing the information needs of potential investors in order to mitigate the problem of information 
asymmetry and, in turn, to reduce the cost of capital (Botosan, 1997; Elliott & Jacbson, 1994) and the 
underpricing of IPO shares. An Italian IPO prospectus contains extensive information ranging from an operating 
and financial review to detailed information on directors and executive officers (e.g., senior management 
conflicts of interests, remunerations and benefits, pending arbitrations, etc.). As far as risk information is 
concerned, the first pages of a typical prospectus warn the reader against the primary uncertainties that may 
affect the company’s performance. 
We examine the IPO risk disclosures of six manufacturing and six information technology (IT) Italian 
companies. The choice to focus on these industries responds to the recent call for industry-focused research on 
risk disclosures (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). It is widely believed that industry membership is a key driver in 
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shaping companies’ risk profiles (Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley, 2004a). However, there is limited empirical 
evidence on how risk disclosures vary across industries.   
To address the above issue, internet and software providers and manufacturing companies have been 
selected to represent industry different extremes with regard to degrees of competition, technology challenges, 
and growth prospects. Given the shifting regulations, the rate of technological obsolescence, and the level of 
competition faced by internet and software firms, do these firms provide fuller risk information? If so, does this 
correspond to a higher level of quality? This cross-sector comparison has two objectives. First, it seeks to 
examine the content and dimensions of the risk information disclosed during an IPO. Second, it tests the extent 
to which industry membership affects the level and content of disclosure. 
The paper has the following structure: In the second section, the relevant literature on risk disclosure is 
examined, and this review shapes the study hypotheses. The third section explains the methodology. The last 
section illustrates the findings and suggests implications for further studies.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses development 
The empirical literature on risk reporting includes two main streams of research. Most studies focus exclusively 
on financial risk reporting, as mandated by specific standards or regulations (FRR 48), to investigate its 
information content and usefulness for investors (Campbell et al., 2014; Linsmeier et al., 2002; Rajgopal, 1999; 
Schrand, 1997). The other body of research comprises several studies that examine companies’ risk reporting 
practices to assess the determinants and the quality of disclosures. This research employs content analysis to 
identify risk information and measure its characteristics. Risk disclosures are generally classified into several 
main categories based on a model proposed by professional bodies and practitioners (Abid & Shaiq, 2015; 
Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Kajüter, 2006; Linsley & Shrives, 2006). The quality of disclosures has, instead, been 
measured using different indicators relating to: i) the quantity of information (Abraham & Cox, 2007); ii) the 
number of risk categories covered (Miihkinen, 2012); and iii) the characteristics of the disclosures (Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley & Shrives, 2006).   
Lajili and Zéghal (2005) have examined the contents of the risk disclosures of TSE 300 Canadian 
companies, considering both mandatory and voluntary information. They find that: (1) the sampled companies 
report primarily descriptive information of financial, commodity, and market risks; (2) the information concerns 
only down-side risks; (3) risk assessment and sensitivity analyses are not disclosed. Overall, the results show 
limited voluntary risk disclosure, without exploring possible determinants. Along the same lines, Linsley and 
Shrives (2006, 2005) find minimal disclosures of quantified risk information in the annual reports of 79 non-
financial UK companies. Once again, the disclosures consist of generalized statements of risk policy. Apart from 
a positive relationship with company size, specific company determinants are not tested. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), who produced a framework to analyze the quality of risk information 
disclosed by Italian listed companies at the end of 2001, adopt a different approach. Assuming that the quality of 
a disclosure depends on the quantity of information disclosed and the richness of its content, they develop a 
disclosure index obtained as a simple arithmetic mean of four indices: relative quantity (RQT); density (DEN), 
which is used to measure how risk information is diluted into the mass of other pieces of information; depth 
(DPT), which is used to identify risk type attributes (e.g., forecast information and quantitative forecast 
information); and standardized outlook profile (OPR), which is used to capture risk management information. 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) find that their index is not influenced by either company size or industry 
differences, which are  the two main factors identified in the literature as powerful determinants of disclosure 
behaviour of listed companies (Ahmed and Courtis 1999). With regard to the characteristics of risk disclosure, 
they find that the majority of disclosures comprise non-quantified information related to actions or decisions 
already taken in order to face risks.  
By examining a mandatory regime, the German Accounting Standard on risk reporting (GAS 5), 
Kajuter (2006) finds a significant increase in risk disclosures among German listed companies: from 6 to 11 
references over a five-year period from 1999 to 2003. However, risk reports remain rather vague, focusing on 
external risks instead of internal risks. In terms of risk drivers, Abraham and Cox (2007) examine the 
determinants of risk reporting among the UK FTSE 100 companies. They break down the risk information into 
three main categories, based on regulatory definitions: a) business risk reporting; b) financial risk reporting; c) 
internal control risk reporting. Then, they examine the effects of ownership and corporate governance on the 
extent of risk disclosure. They find that there is a positive relationship between disclosure and board size and a 
negative relationship with share ownership by long-term institutions, concluding that, whereas independent 
directors fulfill a monitoring function, the long-term institutional owners have a preference for firms with lower 
risk profiles.  
From the above review, it appears that the extant literature has focused mainly on risk disclosure 
practices addressed in companies’ annual reports. The principal evidence is that directors avoid quantifying risk, 
tend to disclose information concerning past risks, withhold information on future activities, and prefer to 
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disclose positive risk news. This study investigates the ways in which companies report risk information during 
their IPOs to offer a benchmark against which to compare current reporting practices. Namely, the study has two 
objectives: i) to examine the content and characteristics of IPO risk disclosures, focusing on the time orientation 
and quantification of risk declarations; ii) to test whether there are differences in IPO risk disclosure practices 
across the industries selected.  
With regard to the first objective, disclosure theory (Healy and Palepu, 2001) and empirical evidence 
(Bukh, Nielsen, Gormsen, & Mouritsen, 2005; Cordazzo, 2007) suggest that, during the IPO stage, managers 
may be keen to provide forward-looking and quantitative information about risk to fulfill the information needs 
of potential investors. Yet, managers may be reluctant to reveal such information because of the proprietary costs 
associated with the release of sensitive information to competitors (Guo, Lev, & Zhou 2004; Verrechia, 2001) 
and the litigation costs determined by inadequate or misleading information discloses in the IPO (Richardson, 
2001). Hill and Short (2009) find that UK IPO companies provide greater percentages of forward-looking 
information, though they avoid quantifying their risk exposure. Consistent with this empirical evidence, we posit 
the following hypotheses:  
H1: The quantity of forward-looking risk disclosure will be higher than non-forward-looking 
information (i.e., past, present or non-time-specific information). 
H2: The quantity of quantitative risk disclosure will be lower than that of qualitative risk information.  
With regard to the second objective, disclosure studies indicate that voluntary disclosures are affected 
by the sector variable (Ahmed & Courtis, 1999; Haniffa & Cooke, 2002). Specifically, in the case of risk 
disclosures, it can be expected that the competitive and industry environments significantly shape companies’ 
risk profiles. Bukh et al. (2005) examine IC disclosures in prospectuses and find significant differences in the 
levels of disclosure of high-tech and low-tech companies, with the former disclosing far more information 
related to intellectual capital than the latter. The expectation is that high-technology companies disclose more 
information than low-technology firms because of their faster technological changes, higher degrees of 
competition, and potentially larger operational risks. In a similar vein, we expect that the quantity of disclosed 
forward looking and quantitative risk information will be higher for IT companies. Thus, we posit that:  
H3: Traditional firms report less extensively on risk information than knowledge-intensive companies. 
H4: Traditional firms report less forward looking/quantitative risk information than knowledge 
intensive companies. 
 
3. Methodology  
3.1 Sample selection  
Our sample includes 12 companies from the 87 newly listed companies on the Milan Stock Exchange from 
January 2000 to December 2005. The IT industry was chosen because of its high level of competition and 
potential growth opportunities, and the manufacturing industry was selected to represent the other extreme. In 
order to construct our sample of companies, the following four sectors were chosen from the Datastream 
industrial classification at the sixth level: i) durable household producers (DHP), ii) industrial machinery (IM); 
iii) the Internet (INT); and iv) software and computer services (S&CS). The largest three companies from each 
sector in terms of market capitalization on their first trading day were selected and clustered into two main 
groups, each consisting of six companies, referred to hereafter as the manufacturing and IT groups. Table 1 
reports the company names and other characteristics.  
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Table 1: Sample Characteristics  
   Size1 ML euro Gearing2  Subsidiaries3 Market-to-book ratio4 
Panel A - Manufacturing companies    
Saeco (DHP)   480.80 0.40 15 2.7 
De Longhi (DHP)   1,475.30 0.60 31 0.96 
Lavorwash (DHP)   82.70 0.45 2 2.1 
Biesse  (IM)   385.93 0.58 16 1.7 
Procomac (IM)   N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Fidia (IM)   56.80 0.44 4 2.6 
Average    496.31 0.5 13.6 2.0 
Panel B - IT companies       
Freedomland (INT) 380.40 0.09 0 4.2 
I.Net (INT)   199.50 0.23 1 11.2 
Dada (INT)   98.10 0.11 0 5.5 
Datamat  (S&CS)   303.60 0.30 5 3 
Engineering (S&CS)   249.90 0.38 1 3.6 
Inferentia (S&CS)   53.80 0.17 2 5.3 
Average    214.22 0.2 1.5 5.5 
1. Size is measured as total assets (Worldscope item 2999). 2. Gearing is measured as total debt/total assets 
(Worldscope items [(3251+3101)/2999]. 3. Subsidiaries are the no of wholly owned companies. 4. Market-to-
book ratio is measured as market capitalization at first day of trading/total shareholders’ funds [Borsa Valori 
item/Worldscope (3995+34226)]. 
 
3.2 Narrative material analyzed  
In Italy, companies making IPOs of securities must comply with the requirements of Legislative Decree no. 
58/1998: Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation (the Decree) and CONSOB (the Italian Stock Exchange 
Commission) Regulation no. 11971/1999 (the Regulation). The latter specifies the content of IPO prospectuses 
and provides a template with a list of items for inclusion. Although the Regulation provides a defined framework, 
it contains only general mandatory requirements, which allow companies a degree of discretion with regard to 
the specific items to be disclosed and the level of detail to be provided. In consequence, the information provided 
in the IPO prospectus can be assumed to be semi-voluntary and, hence, to depend on managers’ incentives, even 
in the presence of the prospectus regulations.   
The analyzed prospectus narratives are those disclosures that may refer, either directly or indirectly, to 
some risk categories contained in the unaudited sections of the IPO prospectuses. The excluded sections, in 
addition to the pro-forma financial statements, were the second section (Information on the Shares Offered) and 
the third section (Information Regarding the Offer). Additional items were excluded due to being highly 
regulated by the Italian Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation (Testo Unico della Finanza) or fairly 
standard in nature. These included corporate governance statements, directors’ remuneration reports, information 
on main shareholders, and lists of group companies. Figure 1 reports the Italian IPO template with the analyzed 
narratives.  
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A   Cover          
B   Index         
C   Warnings to investors          
D   Summary information concerning the issuer and the offer        
    SECTION I - Information on the Issuer          
E I Information on the business          
   1.1 History and development of the business          
   1.2 Business overview         
   1.3 Property, plants, and equipment          
   1.4 Significant events affecting the information disclosed from item 1.2. to item 1.3   
   1.5 Description of the organizational structure          
   1.6 Additional information          
  1.6.1 Key directors and employees         
  1.6.2 Investments          
  1.6.3 Research & development          
  1.6.4 Legal proceedings         
  1.6.5 Taxation         
   1.7 Information concerning the issuer's group           
F II Information on the administrative, management, and supervisory bodies    
G III Information on the ownership structure          
H IV Information on the issuer's financial position and economic performance     
I V Information regarding recent developments         
L  VI Summary information regarding the issuer and share capital      
   SECTION II - Information on the Offered Shares     
M VII Information concerning the shares          
N VIII Information on recent negotiation of shares         
    SECTION III - Information on the Offer         
O IX Information concerning the issuer          
P X Information concerning the coordinators and underwriters        
Q XI Information concerning the offer          
R XII Information concerning the listing           
S   Appendices and documents available to the public        
T   Information regarding the audit company and the legal consultants     
Figure 1: Information items in Italian IPO prospectus template. The analyzed narratives are 
highlighted in grey. Source: Consob Regulation no. 11971/1999. 
 
3.3 Coding unit, development of the coding instrument, and text preparation  
This study adopts a comprehensive content analysis based on multi-dimensional coding to quantify the level of 
risk disclosure and its characteristics. A first choice was made between disclosure index and frequency of risk 
item occurrence. These two options represent two alternative ways through which content analysis has been 
historically used to measure the volume of voluntary and/or mandatory disclosures in annual reports. 
We deemed the disclosure index to be incapable of meeting the objective of this study, which is to 
capture the level of risk disclosure and to examine its nature and characteristics. To mitigate the potential loss of 
information implied by a simple binary code, and treating equally a company that makes only one disclosure 
with a company that makes several disclosures (Beattie & Thomson, 2007, p. 20; Marcus & Adler, 1998, p. 242) 
concerning a specific risk category, we use sentences as the coding unit and the number of lines as the 
measurement unit. We acknowledge that word or text units have been used to quantity risk disclosure (Marcus & 
Adler, 1998); however, their coding to different risk categories without reference to the sentence/paragraph as a 
whole may limit the coding reliability. In other words, risk information may be correctly interpreted only within 
the context of a sentence or paragraph.  
In the first stage, the selected narrative text was examined. A reference—that is, a sentence—was 
detected as risk-relevant if it allowed the reader to be better informed about past and potential threats or 
opportunities arising from external or internal variables (Linsley & Shrives, 2005, p. 295). At the same time, 
each risk disclosure was coded according to 76 risk categories, drawing upon the Arthur Andersen Model (1998). 
This model has already been used used to analyse risk information in annual reports by the ICAEW (1999) and, 
in accommodated form, by Linsley and Shrives (2005, 2006) for UK public companies, thus enhancing the 
validity of the coding analysis (Weber, 1985 p.12). Figure 2 details the risk categories used in the analysis.   
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Main risk categories (7) Code  Risk sub-categories (76) Code  
Environment risk   ENV Country and political  COUN 
(13 categories)  Legal  LEGAL 
  Regulatory   REG  
   Social and demographic  SOC  
  Climatic and catastrophic  CATA  
  Industry structure IS  
  Competitor COMP  
  Customer  CUS  
  Technological Innovation  TECH  
  Capital availability  CAP  
  Sensitivity  SENS  
  Shareholder relations SHARE  
Operational risk  OP Customer satisfaction  SAT  
(17 categories) Human resource  HUMAN  
  Knowledge gap capital  KNOW  
  Product development  PROD 
  Efficiency  EFFI 
  Capacity  CAPY 
  Performance gap  PERGAP  
  Cycle time  CYCLE  
  Sourcing  SOURCE 
  Channel effectiveness CHAN 
  Partnering PART 
  Compliance  REGCOMP 
  Business interruption BUSINTER  
  Product/service failure PRODFAIL  
  Environmental  ENVCOM  
  Employee health & safety  EMPSAFE 
    Trade mark/brand erosion  BERO 
Financial risk  FIN  Interest rate  PINTER 
(12 categories) Currency  PCUR 
  Equity  PEQUITY 
  Commodity  PCOM  
  Financial instruments  PIN 
  Cash flow  LICASH 
  Opportunity cost  LIOP 
  Concentration  LICON 
  Default CREDE 
  Credit concentration  CRECON 
  Settlement  CRESET 
    Collateral  CRECOL  
Empowerment risk  EP Leadership LEAD 
(6 categories) Authority  AU  
  Outsourcing  OUTS 
  Performance incentives  INCENS 
  Communications  COMS 
    Change readiness  MGCH 
Information technology  risk  INPRO Integrity  INTEG  
 (4 categories) Access  INAC 
  Availability  INA 
    Infrastructure  ITS 
Integrity risk (5 categories)  INTEG Management fraud  MGTF 
  Employee/third part fraud EMPF 
  Illegal acts IA 
  Unauthorized use  UNAUTHOR  
    Reputation REPU 
Information decision making risk   Pricing  PRI 
 (13 categories)  Contract commitment  CONTRACT  
   Operation measurement  OMEAS 
   Alignment  ALIGN 
   Environment scan  ENVSCAN 
   Business portfolio  PORTSTRA 
  Planning PLAN  
  Strategic valuation  VALUSTRA  
  Performance measurement  PERMEAS  
  Organization structure  ORGAN 
  Resource allocation  RESAL 
  Life cycle  LCYCLE 
   Regulatory reporting  FREG 
  Budget and planning BUDGET 
  Accounting information  AINFO  
  Financial reporting evaluation  REVALU 
  Taxation  TAX 
  Pension fund  PENF 
    Investment evaluation  IEVALU 
Figure 2: Risk categories  
The analysis was taken one step further by examining two characteristics: the quantitative/non 
quantitative nature and the time orientation of the risk information. Each item was coded as quantitative 
whenever it provided quantifiable financial or non-financial information. It can easily be argued that this type 
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attribute is contingent upon topic, implying that quantitative information is not always better than qualitative 
information. However, the UK Reporting Statement on the Operating and Financial Review (ASB, 2005) 
includes different disclosure examples for key performance indicators based on quantitative measures (e.g., IG 
Examples 12 to 14, 17, and 18). The second coding, instead, was designed to distinguish between future and 
past/non-time-specific risk information. Thus, risk items that directly specified future uncertainties were coded 
as forward-looking all others were coded as non-forward-looking.  
As the final step, the identified sentences were expressed in terms of their numbers of lines to measure 
the overall amount of disclosure for each risk item. Using the number of lines as a unit of measurement provides 
a complete and meaningful way of undertaking further analysis when sentences are used as a coding unit. 
Markus and Adler (1998, p. 243) advocate the use of sentences for both coding and measuring social and 
environmental disclosures within annual reports, although they recognized that, once the content has been coded, 
quantification may be done in a number of different ways.  
A preliminary coding of two prospectuses was undertaken in order to assess and refine the coding 
process. Three main issues arose and were examined by a second coder familiar with content analysis. Firstly, 
the IPO prospectuses were different in terms of font size, characters and margins. It was decided that such 
differences would be eliminated by converting the original format (PDF format) to a standard text format file. 
Furthermore, following Hussainey and Walker (2006), we removed all images, charts, pictures, and graphics. 
After converting the IPO prospectuses, the final text format included only those references that had already been 
coded off screen. On average, six working days were necessary to code each prospectus and to perform this 
conversion. 
Secondly, it was noted that the risk items did not always represent fully mutually exclusive categories. 
For example, disclosures concerning the development of new products could be coded either as COMP: Actions 
and Plans to meet competition within a market segment or as PROD: Product Development Objectives. 
Following Beattie, McInnes, & Fearnley (2004b, p. 218), we decided that the appropriate code for any reference 
should be the most specific one. Thus, whenever it became clear from the context that an item referred to an 
action for enhancing a company’s market position, the item was coded as COMP. All of the conflicts were 
resolved following this specificity principle, and flags and examples were added to the coding instrument 
(Boyatzis, 1998, p. 31). Appendix 3 presents an extract of the developed coding instrument. 
 
3.4 Reliability assessment  
There are three types of reliability tests that can be used to ensure that a coding process achieves unbiased data to 
allow the drawing of valid inferences (Krippendorff, 2004, pp. 214-216): stability, which refers to the extent to 
which a coder replicates the same results over time; reproducibility, which assesses the extent to which two or 
more coders apply the same recording rules consistently; and accuracy, which compares a coding process with a 
given standard. The most commonly adopted test is the second one (Beattie et al., 2004b, p. 214), since stability 
is a weak measure that considers only individual inconsistencies and the development of a coding standard to test 
accuracy is still an open issue, especially in the context of risk disclosure. 
The coefficient used to measure the reproducibility of the coded data was that developed by Scott 
(1995), which adjusts the simple coefficient of agreement—that is, the ratio of pairwise interjudge judgements to 
the total number of pairwise judgements—taking into account the agreement achieved by chance. 
A sample of 97 references from both the largest and the smallest companies was randomly selected and 
analyzed by the second coder. Three coefficients of agreement were calculated for each dimension of the coding 
instrument. At the risk category level, the coefficient was equal to 81%; at the risk item level, it was 71.1%; for 
the time dimension, it was 89%; and for the quantitative/qualitative dimension, it was 92%. Scott’s pi was 79% 
at the risk category level and 69% at the risk item level. Except for the latter coefficient, which was slightly 
below the cut-off level deemed acceptable by the literature (Boyatzis, 1998, p. 156; Guthrie & Matthews, 1985, 
p. 261), the test produced highly satisfactory results. 
 
4. Findings and analysis 
The amount of risk disclosure and its distribution, according to content and type attributes, are presented in Table 
2. The absolute volume of identified total disclosures equalled 6,635 lines in the manufacturing sample and 
5,039 lines in the IT sample. Although the manufacturing companies were smaller in size, in terms of market 
capitalization, they disclosed a 32% higher volume of risk information than the IT companies. Total risk 
disclosure (TRD) ranged from 709 to 1,502 lines for manufacturers and from 613 to 998 lines for IT companies. 
Scaling our variable of interest (TRD) by the total number of risk lines present in each prospectus, the obtained 
percentages reveal that the IT companies had, on average, relatively higher risk disclosures than the 
manufacturers (36.86% versus 32.00%). 
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Table 2: Risk Disclosure in IPO prospectuses    
Panel A - Total Risk Disclosure (TRD)         
    Manufacturing   IT   
    (n=6)   (n=6)   
TRD - Mean    1,105.83   839.83   
TRD - Std. Dev.   267.15   157.10   
TRD - Percentage    32.00%   36.86 %   
TRD - Minimum    709   613   
TRD - Maximum   1,502   998   
TRD - Total risk disclosure    6,635   5,039   
Total IPO narratives    20,731   13,671   
TRD - Manufacturers/IT         32% 
 
Panel B  - Type of Information: Qualitative (QL ) vs Quantitative (QN ) Risk Disclosure 
    Manufacturing   IT   
    (n=6)   (n=6)   
QL - Mean    678.50   544.00   
QL - Std. Dev.   238.00   81.17   
QL - Percentage    61.36%   64.78%   
QL - Total   4,071   3,264   
Wilcoxon significance test   0.05   0.05   
QN - Mean    427.33   678.50   
QN - Std. Dev.   116.81   238.00   
QN - Percentage    38.64%   35,22   
QN - Total   2,564   1,775   
Wilcoxon significance test   0.05   0.05   
 
Panel C: Time Orientation: Non-Forward-Looking (NFL) vs Forward-Looking (FL) 
    Manufacturing   IT   
    (n=6)   (n=6)   
NFL- Mean    810.50   481.67   
NFL - Std. Dev.   224.90   160.60   
NFL - Percentage    73.29%   57.35%   
NFL - Total   4,863   2,89   
Significance Wilcoxon test   0.05   0.05   
FL- Mean    295.33   358.17   
FL - Std. Dev.   107.65   68.15   
FL - Percentage    26.71%   42.65%   
FL - Total   1.772   2,149   
Significance Wilcoxon test   0.05   0.05   
 
Panel D: Rask categories            
    Manufacturing   IT   
    (n=6)   (n=6)   
ENV- Mean    468.67   473.67   
ENV - Std. Dev.   71.74   129.74   
ENV - Percentage    42.38%   56.40%   
ENV - Total   2,812   2,842   
OP - Mean    442.33   267.50   
OP- Std. Dev.   146.12   86.31   
OP - Percentage    40.00%   31.85%   
OP - Total   2,654   1,605   
FIN - Mean    72.33   39.00   
FIN - Std. Dev.   19.81   19.87   
FIN - Percentage    6.54%   4.64%   
FIN - Total   434   234   
EP - Mean    14.33   3.50   
EP - Std. Dev.   14.26   5.431   
EP - Percentage    1.30%   0.42%   
EP - Total   86   21   
INPRO  - Mean    5.33   12.00   
INPRO - Std. Dev.   11.22   14.87   
INPRO - Percentage    0.48%   1.43%   
INPRO - Total   32   72   
INTEG - Mean    0   3.33   
INTEG - Std. Dev.   0   3.88   
INTEG - Percentage    0   0.40%   
INTEG - Total   0   20   
DM - Mean    102.83   40.83   
DM - Std. Dev.   54.50   31.24   
DM - Percentage    9.30%   4.84%   
DM - Total   617   244   
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Panel B of Table 2 reveals two issues related to the types of information disclosed within the IPO 
prospectuses. First, the majority of data were qualitative for both types of companies: about 61.36% (64.78%) of 
the analyzed volume for the manufacturers (IT companies). These findings are consistent with previous 
empirical evidence (e.g., Linsley & Shrives, 2006), and they show the directors’ reluctance to quantify risk 
information. On the other hand, a different pattern emerges concerning the time orientation of the risk 
disclosures. Although both types of companies were cautious in providing information relating to the future, the 
IT companies disclosed a larger proportion of forward-looking disclosures: 42.65%, compared to 26.71% for 
manufacturers. This difference could be related to the greater level of intangibles, or intellectual capital (IC), 
associated with high-tech companies, thus supporting the proposition that risk reporting is a promising way to 
provide non-accounting, forward-looking information to investors (ICAEW, 1999, p. 33). To highlight the 
potential significance of intangibles in relation to risk disclosures, Table 1 indicates, among other context 
variables, the market-to-book ratios for each company at the first trading date. For the IT sample, the ratio was, 
on average, 5.5; for the manufacturing sample, the ratio was only 2.0. 
Other valuable insights into the characteristics of risk information emerged from the analysis of the 
content of the information provided. Panel D reports the distribution of risk disclosures across risk categories by 
sector. This distribution reveals that, with some differences between the two samples, overall disclosures 
concentrated on environment risk (ENV) and operational risk (OP). The IT companies seemed to provide a 
higher proportion of information related to external risks (56.40%) than the manufacturers did (42.38%), though 
the absolute volumes were similar (2,842 lines versus 2,812 lines). By contrast, the manufacturing companies 
appeared to place a higher emphasis on operating risks (40.00% versus 31.85%) and decision-making risks 
(9.30% versus 4.84%), with marked differences in absolute terms (2,654 versus 1,605 lines for the former risk 
category and 617 versus 244 lines for the latter risk category). 
Surprisingly, the information disclosed for the other components of risk was minor or even absent. Risk 
related to the companies’ financial positions (FIN) accounted for only about 6.54% (4.64%) of total lines 
reported by manufacturers (IT companies), representing 434 (234) lines in absolute terms. Empowerment risk 
(EP) comprised only 86 lines in the manufacturing sample and 21 lines in the IT sample. Information processing 
and technology risk (INPRO) was addressed in only 72 lines in the IT sample and 32 lines in the manufacturing 
sample. Finally, only two IT companies provided information concerning integrity risk (INTEG).  
The median differences test between the type attributes indicates that NFL and QL information is 
significantly more prevalent than FL and QN information for the two subsamples - manufacturers and IT 
companies. This finding supports H2. As for the differences between sectors, the Mann-Whitney test reveals 
(Table 3) that the IT companies disclosed relatively more future-oriented information and more ENV disclosures 
than manufacturers. In general, this evidence provides partial support for H3 and H4, since industry appears to 
affect disclosure with regard to the environmental risk category and its time orientation.    
Table 3: Sector Differences in IPO Risk Disclosures  
Code1      Sector  Median 
Median2  
difference 
(Manuf.vs IT)  
Mann-   Whitney 
U0statistic 
 
Significance test 
 
       
TOT Manufacturing  33.80 -3.45 1.281 0.240 
 IT  37.25    
ENV Manufacturing  42.70 -11.50 2.242 0.026 
  IT  54.20    
OP Manufacturing  39.00 3.00 -1.121 0.310 
  IT  36.00    
FIN Manufacturing  6.60 2.60 -1.764 0.093 
  IT  4.00    
EP Manufacturing  1.00 0.80 -1.164 0.310 
  IT  0.20    
INPRO Manufacturing  0.00 -0.65 0.893 0.485 
  IT  0.65    
INTEG Manufacturing  0.00 -0.35 1.897 0.180 
  IT  0.35    
DM Manufacturing  9.45 4.95 - 1.922 0.065 
  IT  4.50    
FL Manufacturing  24.45 -21.35 2.242 0.026 
  IT  45.80    
QN Manufacturing  40.35 6.70 - 0.961 0.393 
  IT  33.65    
Notes: 1. ENV, OP, FIN, EP, INPRO, INTEG, and DM are the codes used for the main risk categories. Respectively, they represent the 
environmental, operational, financial, empowerment, integrity, and decision making risk components. FL and QN refer to the coded type 
dimension (forward-looking and quantitative types). 2. The differences between sectors have been investigated using the company-based 
mean. Un-tabulated summary statistics show that this does not differ remarkably from the text-based mean used in the main body of the study. 
*** denotes 0.01 statistical significance, ** denotes 0.05 statistical significance, *denotes 0.1 statistical significance. 
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So far, it appears that both types of companies are keen on providing a broad volume of information 
concerning i) risks arising from the external environment (ENV); ii) internal risks related to companies’ 
processes (OP); and iii) risks associated with the relevance and reliability of information provided by companies 
(DM). By contrast, traditional financial risks are uncommon, and other sources of uncertainties are almost absent. 
Moreover, IT companies say relatively more than manufacturers about environmental risks and provide more FL 
information. To further investigate these reporting pattern, the volume of risk information has been examined, 
considering risk sub-category, to assess whether specific types of risks could be identified in the two samples. 
Figure 3 provides the distribution and the ranking of the top 10 risk categories across sectors, while Table 4 
introduces the cumulative percentages for the top 20 risk categories. The former figure suggests that both types 
of companies share a similar pattern regarding the top five risk categories: competitor (COMP), industry (IS), 
shareholder (SHARE), human resource (HUMAN), and product development risk (PROD). It is only in relation 
to industry risk (IS) that IT companies appear to provide a higher proportion of risk information. 
Panel (a): Manufacturing companies  
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Panel (b): IT companies  
 
Figure 3: Distribution and ranking of top 10 risk categories by sector 
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 Table 4: Ranking of Top 20 Risk Categories  
Code   
Manufacturing                                     
(n=6.635) 
IT                                     
(n=5.039) 
   Rank  %  Cum. % Rank  %  Cum. % 
COMP    1 18.3 18.3 1 21.9 21.9 
IS  2 12.3 30.5 2 17.8 39.7 
SHARE  3 9.6 40.1 3 10.9 50.5 
HUMAN  4 5.8 45.9 4 8.2 58.8 
PROD  5 5.4 51.3 5 4.0 62.8 
SAT  10 3.4 54.7 7 3.0 65.7 
SOURCE  9 3.6 58.3 8 2.7 68.5 
TAX  6 4.4 62.7 21 1.1 69.6 
REGCOMP  12 2.9 65.7 9 2.7 72.2 
BERO   8 3.9 69.6 17 1.4 73.6 
LICASH  14 2.3 71.9 6 3.4 77.0 
EFFI   7 4.1 75.9 22 1.1 78.1 
PRODFAIL  11 3.1 79.1 16 1.4 79.5 
AINFO   13 2.8 81.9 14 1.7 81.3 
CAPY  15 2.2 84.1 15 1.7 83.0 
BUSINTER  16 1.8 85.9 12 2.0 84.9 
CHAN  17 1.6 87.5 11 2.0 87.0 
REG  21 0.9 88.5 13 1.9 88.8 
VALUSTRA  19 1.4 89.9 19 1.2 90.1 
TECH    28 0.4 90.3 10 2.2 92.2 
Notes: n represents the total number of risk lines coded within the company's IPO prospectus; % shows the 
proportion of the total number of risk lines, n; and cum. % denotes the cumulative percentage across rankings. 
The shaded risk categories are those that fall outside the overall top 20.  
A heavy concentration of disclosures within the same risk categories across the two sectors is evident. 
Table 4 shows that the top five risk categories account together for nearly 62.8% (51.3%) of the total IT 
(manufacturing) IPO risk disclosures. For the next 15 categories, we observe that the level of information drops 
to an average of nearly 2% (3%) for the IT (manufacturing) sector, suggesting that the information is equally 
spread across these categories. The remaining 55 risk categories account for less than 10%, cumulatively.  
However, a closer inspection of Table 4 reveals some differences, which are marked by the shading of 
those risk categories that fall outside the overall top 20. In particular, manufacturers make relatively more 
disclosures related to taxation (TAX) and efficiency risk (EFFI), whereas IT companies seem to have relatively 
higher disclosures related to technological risk (TECH) and regulatory risk (REG). Such differences may be 
justified as follows: Given the articulated group structure of the manufacturing companies, emphases on taxation 
and on organization efficiency, such as plans concerning restructures, are plausible. Moreover, given the 
uncertain regulation and the technological drifts typical of the IT sector, these companies can be expected to 
emphasize regulation and technological risks.  
Combining the two analyses undertaken at the risk categories and sub-risk categories levels, it can be 
seen that the disclosure patterns for both sectors are similar, focusing mainly on three specific external risk 
categories that are considered to have particular value to users (Beattie, 1999). This finding is consistent with the 
patterns observed by Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Kajüter (2006), Linsley and Shrives (2006, 2005), within the 
Italian, German, and UK annual reports, respectively. This confirms the view that directors are more open to 
disclosing external risks that are faced by every company in their sector than they are to disclosing internal risks. 
However, the Italian prospectuses do not emphasize financial risks to the same extent found in the annual reports 
(e.g., Lajili & Zéghal 2005). A potential explanation for this difference may involve the specific material 
examined: Given the initial investment decision context of prospectuses, directors may be more willing to 
discuss strategic and operational risks than to comment on financial uncertainties.  
With regard to the other examined dimensions—that is, quantitative/qualitative and forward-looking 
orientations—it was confirmed that companies are reluctant to report quantitative and forward-looking risk 
information (Beretta & Bozzolan, 2004; Kajüter, 2006; Lajili & Zéghal 2005). This supports the view that risk 
reporting still needs to be improved (ASB, 2007) and suggests that the lack of guidance on the preferred 
dimensions of risk disclosures may be of little help to readers who wish to know the size of future principal risks 
and how these are managed (CICA, 2006). Inevitably, differences in units of measurement, as well as in the 
extent of the narrative material examined, lead to higher absolute volumes of risk information than those 
identified in the annual reports.  
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5. Discussion 
This study contributes to the extant literature on risk reporting in two principal ways. In terms of the first 
research objective, concerning the amount and content of risk information disclosed within IPO prospectuses, the 
results show that the relative amounts of risk information disclosed represent 32% and 37% of the overall IPO 
narratives examined. This figure reveals that, during the phase of their initial public offerings, Italian companies 
are aware of the importance of risk information. Further, extensive disclosures of risk information within three 
external risk categories (competitor, industry, and shareholder risk) were found, whereas financial risk 
represented only a small percentage of the total disclosures. This suggests that companies are eager to provide 
detailed information on external risks, which may be of particular interest to investors during initial placements 
and which may be less sensitive to proprietary costs. Financial risks, by contrast, are more appreciated in the 
annual report context (Linsley & Shrives, 2006). Moreover, in terms of risk dimensions, both industries 
exhibited a high proportion of qualitative and historical information. This finding is consistent with previous 
empirical studies on Italian (Bozzolan & Beretta, 2004), German (Kajüter, 2006) and Canadian annual reports 
(Lajili & Zéghal, 2005), indicating that further guidance for the dimensions of risk disclosures may be helpful to 
readers who wish to know the size and management of future risks. 
With regard to the second research objective, we did not find considerable differences between the 
manufacturers and the IT companies in the amount or content of risk information in their IPO prospectuses. The 
latter were more keen to disclose relatively more forward-looking information and external risk categories. 
Overall, the analysis revealed a disclosure pattern characterized by space-filling statements in both industries, 
with the danger that insightful disclosures may be obscured within the high volume of narratives. This finding 
confirms the concerns raised in the literature that the information contained in the IPO prospectuses can be 
shaped by the behavior of a dominant advisor (Hribar, 2004), by the proprietary costs associated with the release 
of sensitive information to competitors (Verrechia, 2001), and by the litigation costs determined by inadequate or 
misleading information disclosures in the IPO. Consequently, although the sector effect may be relevant, and 
though Italian regulation allows a considerable level of subjectivity in the disclosure of risk information, the 
studied IPO prospectuses showed similar disclosure patterns across industries.  
It is worth pointing out that this study has some shortcomings. The methodology used neither allowed 
the investigation of a large number of companies nor any further analysis of the potential causes of disclosure 
levels across companies. Nevertheless, it did allow us to conduct a first assessment of risk disclosure practices in 
Italian prospectuses, which may be used as a basis for the development of further empirical analysis. First, a 
comparison between IPO and annual report risk disclosures (i.e., for the year after the IPO) may contribute to 
analyzing the extent to which the identified reporting pattern has been influenced by external advisors and listing 
regulations. Secondly, it is also relevant to investigate other factors that could drive companies’ risk disclosure 
practices. For instance, the analysis undertaken suggests that the release of commercially sensitive risk 
information may play a significant role in IPO disclosure strategies. Similarly, the exposure to litigation costs 
may be a further significant concern for providing forward-looking information. Thirdly, a demand-side study 
may be useful for appreciating whether the disclosures revealed in prospectuses are considered useful by 
different users. Such insights could be achieved by using a survey to gather new information on institutional 
investors’ views on IPO risk reporting. Finally, to know whether risk warnings are beneficial to companies, 
association tests could be performed to examine whether the quality of risk disclosures is related to the 
performance of IPO stocks. By reducing the information asymmetry surrounding new listed companies, it could 
be expected that transparent risk disclosures should limit the underpricing of Initial public offerings.  
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Appendix A: Extract from the coding instrument 
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